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Substantial uncertainty exists regarding the causal effect of health insurance on the utilization of care.
Most studies cannot determine whether the large differences in healthcare utilization between the insured
and the uninsured are due to insurance status or to other unobserved differences between the two groups.
In this paper, we exploit a sharp change in insurance coverage rates that results from young adults
“aging out” of their parents’ insurance plans to estimate the effect of insurance coverage on the utilization
of emergency department (ED) and inpatient services. Using the National Health Interview Survey
(NHIS) and a census of emergency department records and hospital discharge records from seven
states, we find that aging out results in an abrupt 5 to 8 percentage point reduction in the probability
of having health insurance. We find that not having insurance leads to a 40 percent reduction in ED
visits and a 61 percent reduction in inpatient hospital admissions. The drop in ED visits and inpatient
admissions is due entirely to reductions in the care provided by privately owned hospitals, with particularly
large reductions at for profit hospitals. The results imply that expanding health insurance coverage
would result in a substantial increase in care provided to currently uninsured individuals.
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Over one-quarter of nonelderly adults in the United States lacked health insurance during at 
some point in 2007 (Schoen et al. 2008). A large body of research documents a strong 
association between insurance status and particular patterns of health care utilization. The 
uninsured are less likely to consume preventative care such as diagnostic exams and routine 
checkups (Ayanian et al. 2000). They are more likely to be hospitalized for conditions that – 
if treated promptly – do not require hospitalization (Weissman et al. 1992). Such correlations 
suggest that when individuals lose health insurance, they alter their consumption of health 
care and their health suffers as a result. 
 
But would the uninsured behave differently if they had health insurance? Individuals without 
health insurance have different discount rates, risk tolerances, and medical risks than those 
with health insurance, making causal inference difficult. Little evidence exists that overcomes 
this empirical challenge. Several studies leverage quasi-experimental variation to measure the 
impacts of Medicare and Medicaid, the two largest public insurance programs in the United 
States.
1  Such  studies,  however,  provide  little  insight  about  the  likely  effects  of  coverage 
expansions on the current population of uninsured individuals for two reasons. First, they 
focus only on the near-elderly or the very young, both of whom are at low risk of being 
uninsured. Most of the uninsured are non-elderly adults, particularly young adults. Estimates 
of this population’s reaction to changes in health insurance status are essential to evaluate 
public policies that would expand access to health insurance. Second, studies that focus on 
Medicare  or  Medicaid  cannot  separate  the  effects  of  gaining  health  insurance  from  the 
effects of a transition from private to public insurance. 
 
In this paper, we overcome these challenges by exploiting quasi-experimental variation in 
insurance  status  that  results  from  the  rules  insurers  use  to  establish  the  eligibility  of 
dependents. Many private health insurance contracts cover dependents “eighteen and under” 
and only cover older dependents who are full-time students. As a result, five to eight percent 
of  teenagers  become  uninsured  shortly  after  their  nineteenth  birthdays.  We  exploit  this 
variation  through  a  regression  discontinuity  (RD)  design a n d   compare  the  health  care 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, papers by Dafny and Gruber (2005), Card et al. (2008, 2009), and Currie et al. (2008).   2 
consumption  of  teenagers  who  are  just  younger  than  nineteen  to  the  health  care 
consumption of those who are just older than nineteen. 
 
We examine the impact of this sharp change in coverage using data from the National 
Health Interview Survey (NHIS); emergency department records from Arizona, California, 
Iowa, New Jersey, and Wisconsin; and hospital admission records from Arizona, California, 
Iowa, New York, Texas and Wisconsin. We find that the decrease in insurance coverage 
results  in  a  decreased  level  of  contact  with  health  care  providers.  We  estimate  sizable 
reductions in emergency department (ED) visits, contradicting the conventional wisdom that 
the uninsured are more likely to visit the ED. We also find substantial reductions in non-
urgent hospital admissions. The decrease in both ED and inpatient visits is driven in large 
part by a drop in visits for less-severe medical conditions. Overall, these results suggest that 
an expansion in health insurance coverage would substantially increase the amount of care 
that currently uninsured individuals receive and require an increase in net expenditures. 
 
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  The  following  section  describes  previous  research  on 
insurance and utilization. Section 3 outlines our econometric framework. We document the 
change in insurance coverage in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 present results for ED visits and 
inpatient hospitalizations respectively. In Section 7 we discuss the potential generalizability 
of our results. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  PRIOR EVIDENCE ON THE HEALTH CARE CONSUMPTION OF THE UNINSURED 
 
The uninsured tend to consume expensive health care treatments when cheaper options are 
available. Weissman et al. (1992) find that the uninsured are much more likely to be admitted 
to the hospital for a medical condition that could have been prevented with timely care. 
Similarly, Braveman et al. (1994) estimate that the uninsured are more likely to suffer a 
ruptured appendix, an outcome that can be avoided with timely care. Dozens of similar 
studies are summarized in an Institute of Medicine (2002) report, and nearly all find a robust 
correlation  between  a  lack  of  insurance  and  reliance  on  expensive,  avoidable  medical 
treatments. Some evidence also suggests that the uninsured are more likely to seek care in 
the ED than the insured (Kwack et al. 2004), and it is commonly assumed that uninsured   3 
patients visit the ED for non-urgent problems and contribute to ED crowding (Abelson 
2008, Newton et al. 2008).
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Given the substantial underlying differences between the insured and the uninsured, the 
correlations  documented  in  these  studies  may  not  represent  causal  effects.  To o u r  
knowledge, only two sets of studies have used credible research designs to determine the 
causal  effect  of  insurance  status  on  health  care  utilization.  The  first  of  these  evaluates 
Medicaid expansions. Dafny and Gruber (2005) estimate that Medicaid expansions led to an 
increase  in  total  inpatient  hospitalizations,  but  not  to  a  significant  increase  in  avoidable 
hospitalizations. The authors conclude that being insured through Medicaid leads individuals 
to visit the hospital more often and, potentially, to consume health care more efficiently. 
 
Other  papers  study  the  effect  of  Medicare  on  health  care  utilization.  Finkelstein  (2007) 
studies the aggregate spending effects of the introduction of Medicare, and Card et al. (2008, 
2009) study the effects of Medicare on individual health care consumption. All three papers 
conclude that Medicare leads to a substantial increase in health care consumption. 
 
One  limitation  of  such  studies  is  that  individuals  who  gain  health  insurance  through 
Medicaid and Medicare are often insured beforehand. Cutler and Gruber (1996) demonstrate 
that fifty percent of new Medicaid enrollees were previously enrolled in employer-provided 
insurance  plans.  Similarly,  Card  et  al.  (2008)  conclude  that  much  of  the  increase  in 
hospitalizations  that  occurs  after  people  become  eligible  for  Medicare  is  likely  due  to 
transitions from private insurance to Medicare rather than from no insurance to Medicare. 
Consequently, these papers do not isolate the causal effect of being uninsured on health care 
consumption, which is the object of interest here. 
 
The other limitation of studies focused on Medicare and Medicaid is that their estimates are 
based on the demographic groups at lowest risk of being uninsured. Precisely as a result of 
these two programs, only a small fraction of children or the elderly lack health insurance. 
Most of the uninsured are non-elderly adults, and over half of uninsured non-elderly adults 
                                                 
2 In spite of the positive cross-sectional correlation between uninsured status and ED utilization, however, 
Kwack et al. (2004) find no significant effect of the implementation of a managed care program on ED use 
patterns for formerly uninsured patients.   4 
are between the ages of 19 and 35 (Kriss et al. 2008). Estimates of the effects of health 
insurance coverage on the near-elderly and children are unlikely to be very informative about 
the  effects  of  insurance c o v e r a g e   expansions,  as  such  expansions  will  disproportionately 
affect young adults.  
 
This  study  contributes  to  the  literature  on  health  insurance  in  several  respects.  First,  it 
isolates the effects of uninsured status, avoiding contamination by transitions from private to 
public insurance. Second, it focuses on young adults, a group that is more representative of 
the uninsured population than either children or the elderly. Third, it introduces a corrected 
instrumental variables estimator for data based on a self-selected population, in this case, 
those who present at the hospital. 
 
3.  EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Consider a reduced-form model of the effects of health insurance coverage on health care 
utilization: 
 
(1)           
 
In this model, Yi represents the utilization of care of individual i, and Di is an indicator 
variable equal to unity if individual i has health insurance. The error term, εi, corresponds to 
all other determinants of the outcome Yi. The coefficient   represents the causal effect of 
health insurance on utilization. 
 
It is difficult to obtain consistent estimates of   because health insurance status, Di, is 
correlated with unobserved determinants of utilization. An individual chooses to acquire 
health insurance based on her health and other characteristics that affect both the choice to 
be insured and health outcomes. Some of these characteristics are observable to researchers 
but many are not; uninsured individuals likely have different discount factors, risk tolerances, 
and medical risks than those with health insurance. In the first two columns of Table 1 we 
present summary statistics by health insurance status for young adults (age 18–19) from the 
NHIS. Insured individuals are less likely to be minorities, less likely to be male, less likely to   5 
smoke, and more likely to be attending school. Since observable characteristics are correlated 
with insurance status, it is likely that unobservable characteristics are also correlated with 
insurance status. Consequently, we rely on an instrumental variables strategy, and identify the 
causal effect of health insurance via the sharp discontinuity in insurance coverage rates at age 
19. 
 
Let Zi = 1{Ai > 19} be an indicator variable equal to unity if individual i is older than 19.
3 
When young adults turn 19, they become less likely to be insured. We assume, however, that 
no other variables in equation (1) are affected. In particular, we assume that   is 
continuous at a = 19. This assumption would be violated if other factors affecting health 
care such as employment, school attendance, or risky behaviors, change discontinuously 
when  young  adults  turn  19.  We  discuss  this  assumption  below  and  present  empirical 
evidence that it holds in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 1. 
 
Since  age  is  not  the  sole  determinant  of  insurance  coverage,  the  RD  design  that  we 
implement is a “fuzzy” RD (Campbell 1969). We estimate the reduced form effect of age 19 
on each outcome of interest Yi: 
 
(2)        
 
We estimate the first stage – the share of young adults who lose insurance coverage at age 19 
– in two ways. First, we estimate a straightforward version of equation (2) in the NHIS with 
insurance coverage on the left-hand side. Second, we estimate the first stage using hospital 
records. This poses an additional econometric challenge, however, as the records contain a 
census of visits rather than individuals. In Section 5 we describe the problem and develop a 
method for consistently estimating the first stage using the hospital records. 
 
                                                 
3 Many private health plans cover dependents through the last day of the month in which the dependent turns 
19 (Kriss et al 2008). In Appendix 1 we present empirical evidence that this is the case for the majority of plans 
in California. In the regressions that follow, we code Zi accordingly. The abrupt decrease in private coverage 
documented  in  Figures  5  and  8  is  further  evidence  that  this  coding  is c o r r e c t .  H o w e v e r ,  t o  s i m p l i f y  t h e  
discussion we describe people as aging out when they turn 19.   6 
We can identify γ1, the causal effect of health insurance coverage (Di) on outcome Yi, by 
combining the first stage and reduced form results. We identify this parameter by dividing 
the effect of turning 19 on outcome Yi by the effect of turning 19 on health insurance 
coverage, Di. This strategy is analogous to using the age 19 discontinuity as an instrument to 
identify the causal effect of health insurance (Hahn et al., 2001). 
 
4.  THE  CHANGE  IN  INSURANCE  COVERAGE  RATES  AT  19,  RESULTS  FROM  THE 
NHIS 
 
Figure 1 plots the age profile of insurance coverage, ED visits, and inpatient hospital stays. 
The solid line plots the share uninsured by age. It demonstrates a sharp increase at age 19, 
one that is larger than the decrease in share uninsured at age 65 (due to Medicare). The figure 
reveals  that  young  adults  are  the  age  group  most  likely  to  be  uninsured  and  that  the 
probability of being uninsured peaks around age 22. 
 
Figure 1 also suggests that young adults are not atypical in their consumption of inpatient 
and ED visits when compared to the majority of the adult population. Young adults near age 
19 have a similar probability of having had at least one inpatient visit in the prior year – 
roughly 9% – as adults through age 55. The probability of an ED visit is somewhat higher 
for  young  adults  than  middle-aged  adults,  suggesting  that  young  adults  may  be  more 
representative of the typical ED visitor. 
 
We explore the change in insurance coverage rates more closely by restricting the NHIS 
sample to those within one year of their nineteenth birthday. The NHIS includes questions 
on the type of insurance coverage that a respondent has and whether the respondent has lost 
coverage due to age or leaving school. We combine NHIS data from 1997 to 2007 and keep 
only respondents between 18 and 20 years of age. This trimmed sample includes 24,260 
observations.  Figure  2  plots  the  age  profiles  of  four  insurance  coverage  types:  private 
insurance, uninsured, Medicaid, and other insurance. Immediately at age 19, there is a four-
percentage-point increase in the share of NHIS respondents who report being uninsured.   7 
The figure makes clear that the increase is driven primarily by a decrease in those covered by 
private insurance, and less so by respondents losing Medicaid and other forms of insurance.
4 
 
The abrupt drop in coverage rates is due in large part to a decline in insurance coverage rates 
among people not enrolled in school. In Figure 3 we present the proportion uninsured by 
age for NHIS respondents that are not attending school and for NHIS respondents that are 
attending school.
5 The age profiles in the figure reveal a much larger loss of coverage among 
the group that is not in school than for the general population.
6 Though the proportion of 
the total population that is uninsured increases by only 4.1 percentage points (Figure 2), the 
proportion of out of school respondents who are uninsured increases by 7.1 percentage 
points (Figure 3). This difference is due to the mechanism behind the change in coverage 
rates; many private insurance plans cover dependents beyond age 18 only if the dependents 
are enrolled in school.  
 
Figure 4 provides further evidence that the abrupt decline in insurance coverage at age 19 is 
due to people aging out of their parents’ plans. The NHIS asks respondents why they do not 
have health insurance. Figure 4 plots, by age, the share of respondents who report having 
lost coverage due to age or leaving school.
7 For individuals who are not in school, the 
proportion who report losing insurance for this reason jumps by 5.6 percentage points at age 
19.  This  increase  accounts  for  almost  all  of  the  7.1  percentage  point  increase  in  the 
proportion uninsured for this group. In contrast, the proportion of people who are still in 
school that lose coverage due to age or leaving school increases by only 0.5 percentage 
points at age 19. 
                                                 
4 “Other forms of insurance” include Medicare (for disabled individuals), State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program  (SCHIP),  military  health  care  (e.g.,  Veterans  Affairs  health  care),  and  other  public,  non-
Medicaid/Medicare health care (e.g., Indian Health Service). 
5 NHIS respondents are asked if they have a job or are looking for work. Those that respond negatively can 
choose among several explanations, one of which is “Going to School.” We coded people who responded 
“Going to School” as in school, though the pattern of questions makes it likely that some individuals that are in 
school but are working will be coded as not in school. 
6 Note that the group sizes change with age. The number of individuals in school trends downward with age, 
while the number of individuals not in school trends upwards with age. However, as can be seen in Table 1, 
there is no evidence of discrete changes in the group sizes at the age 19 threshold. 
7  In  the  National  Health  Interview  Survey  the  respondent  is  asked  the  following  question  regarding  all 
household members that are currently without health insurance: “Which of these are reasons (you/subject 
name) stopped being covered or do not have health insurance?” One possible answer they can choose from is, 
“Ineligible because of age/left school”.   8 
 
In Table 2 we present estimates of the discrete change in insurance coverage at age 19 for 
the overall population and for the two subgroups examined in Figure 3. We estimate the size 
of the discrete change in coverage by estimating equation (2) using the individual-level NHIS 
data, restricting our sample to people surveyed within 12 months of the month in which 
their 19
th birthday falls.
8 Each coefficient represents the effect of turning 19 on a specified 
outcome (we report only  , the coefficient on the age 19 indicator, Zi = 1{Ai > 19}). Each 
main row in Table 2 presents results for a different demographic group (all respondents, not 
attending school, attending school), and each main column presents results for a different 
outcome (privately insured, uninsured, Medicaid, and other insurance).
9 Within each main 
column, the left sub-column reports results for the specification described in equation (2), 
and  the  right  sub-column  reports  results  for  a  modified  specification  that  also  includes 
indicator variables for marital status, employment status, race and gender. The additional 
covariates  slightly  increase  precision  but  generally  do  not  affect  the  point  estimates, 




In the first two columns of Table 3 we present the regression estimates corresponding to 
Figure 4. Overall, there is a 4.3 percentage point increase in NHIS respondents who report 
losing insurance at age 19 due to age or leaving school. The NHIS also classifies insurance 
status by whether the respondent is insured in his or her own name or is covered by another 
person’s plan. The third and fourth columns demonstrate that there is no discrete increase in 
the proportion of individuals with coverage in their own name, suggesting that people are 
not replacing their parents’ insurance with their own insurance.
11 
                                                 
8 We use a uniform kernel and a bandwidth of 365 days. The regressions are estimated via a procedure that 
takes into account the stratified sampling frame and the deliberate oversample of minorities in the NHIS. In 
Appendices 2–4 we present evidence that the regression results are fairly robust to the bandwidth choice. 
When estimating the change in insurance coverage using hospital records datasets, we find that the results are 
insensitive to bandwidth choice. 
9 The full age profiles by level of education that correspond to the second and third rows of the table are 
presented in Appendices 5 and 6. 
10 The third row of Table 2 suggests that respondents in school are gaining private insurance at age 19. 
However  the e s t i m a t e s  a r e  only  marginally  significant  at  conventional  levels.  Furthermore,  we  find  that 
estimates for this group are sensitive to the inclusion of covariates, unlike the estimates in the first and second 
rows of the table. 
11 The age profiles corresponding to the regression results are presented in Appendix 7.   9 
 
In sum, we find a large, sudden increase in the share uninsured at age 19 in the NHIS data. 
This increase is driven largely by the individuals that are not in school and thus are at risk of 
aging  out  of  their  parents’  insurance  plans.  In  the  following  sections,  we  exploit  this 
discontinuity in insurance status to determine how insurance status affects the consumption 
of health care services.
12 
 
5.  THE EFFECTS OF HEALTH INSURANCE ON EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT VISITS 
 
Many young adults receive health care at hospital emergency departments. From 2005 to 
2007, approximately 26 percent of 18 and 19 year old NHIS respondents reported receiving 
treatment  in  an  emergency  department  in  the  prior  12  months.  ED  utilization  is  of 
substantial policy interest for two reasons. First, ED crowding is a serious public health issue 
(Fatovich 2002; Trzeciak and Rivers 2003; Kellermann 2006). Whether insurance coverage 
expansions will alleviate or exacerbate ED crowding depends on how insurance coverage 
affects ED utilization. Second, the ED is an expensive location to receive care. Bamezai et 
al. (2005) estimate that the marginal cost of a non-trauma ED visit is $300, a number that 
exceeds  the  average  price,  let  alone  the  marginal  cost,  of  a  doctor’s  visit.
13,14 W h e t h e r  
insurance  coverage  increases  or  decreases  net  ED  usage  thus  affects  the  net  cost  of 
insurance coverage expansions. 
 
                                                 
12 We find evidence in the NHIS that at age 19 there is an increase in the proportion of respondents that forgo 
or delay care due to cost in the last 12 months and no discernable change in the proportion of respondents that 
have seen a health care professional in the last two weeks. However, we do not present these results in the 
body of the paper because the first two results are substantially biased downward due the retrospective nature 
of the questions and the third result is imprecise due to the modest sample size. These results are presented in 
Appendices  8-10,  where  the  bandwidth  has  been  increased  to  1.75  years  so  as  to  reduce  the  amount  of 
attenuation bias and increase the precision of the estimates. 
13 The average total payment for a doctor visit recorded in the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey is $120. 
14 A minority view, put forward by Williams (1996), posits that the marginal cost of an ED visit is relatively 
low, and that EDs charge high prices to transfer the costs of uncompensated care onto the insured. Market-
based tests suggest, however, that ED visits are indeed more expensive than visits to a private doctor. Health 
maintenance  organizations  (HMOs)  generally  enjoy  bargaining  power  over  hospitals  but  still  reimburse 
hospitals hundreds of dollars for each ED visit (Polsky and Nicholson 2004). Additionally, some HMOs own 
hospitals and therefore absorb the true marginal cost of an ED visit when their customers visit EDs. Were ED 
visits less costly than doctor visits, one would expect such HMOs to shift their customers into the ED. But 
these HMOs still provide incentives for patients to use doctor offices rather than EDs. A representative plan 
for the individual market from HMO Kaiser Permanente, for example, charges a $150 copayment for an ED 
visit but a $50 copayment for a doctor visit.   10 
The  questions  regarding  ED  visits  in  the  NHIS  ask  about  visits  in  the  last  year.  This, 
combined with the modest sample size, make it impossible to generate precise estimates of 
how much the probability of an ED visit changes when a person loses their health insurance 
coverage. As an alternative we examine a near census of emergency department visits from 
Arizona,  California,  Iowa,  New  Jersey,  and  Wisconsin.
15  The  records  for  Arizona  and 
California span the 2005 to 2007 calendar years, the records for Iowa and New Jersey span 
the 2004 to 2007 calendar years, and the records for Wisconsin span the 2004 to 2006 
calendar years. For the age group that is the focus of our analysis, 18 and 19 year olds, we 
observe  1,744,394  emergency  department  visits.  For  each  visit,  we  observe  basic 
demographic information including race, ethnicity, gender, type of health insurance, and age 
in months. In addition the dataset includes detailed information on the cause of the visit to 
the ED and the treatment received. 
 
Figure  5  presents  the  age  profile  of  insurance  status  for  visitors  to  the  emergency 
department.
16 Specifically, we plot the proportion with each type of insurance coverage for 
non-overlapping cells of one month of age and superimpose the fitted values from equation 
(2). For most of the states in our sample we are only able to compute age in months as the 
exact date of treatment is not available due to confidentiality concerns. However, this does 
not result in any attenuation bias as the indicator variable Zi is measured without error.
17 The 
figure reveals that the proportion of individuals with private coverage drops steadily with 
age, while the proportion that is uninsured increases with age. Though the age profile of 
insurance coverage has a similar shape to the general population estimates from the NHIS in 
Figure 2, some of the levels are notably different. Estimates from the emergency department 
data show lower rates of private coverage and higher rates of Medicaid and lack of insurance 
coverage. Estimates from the NHIS of the insurance coverage of young adults that have 
received treatment in the emergency department in the prior year show a distribution of 
                                                 
15 Emergency Department visits at hospitals that are not under state oversight such as Veteran Affairs hospitals 
are not included in these datasets. 
16 The expected payer is reported on the medical records. 
17 In all the datasets we observe both the month of birth and the month in which treatment is received. Since 
people age out of their parents insurance at the end of the month in which their birthday falls, we can correctly 
code the instrument Zi using only these two variables. In addition, the coarse age variable does not substantially 
bias or reduce the precision of our estimates, as can be seen in Appendix 11.   11 




Figure  5  also  reveals  that  there  is  a  discrete  reduction  in  private  insurance  coverage 
immediately  after  teenagers  turn  19  and  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  proportion 
uninsured. The proportion privately insured decreases by 5.0 percentage points, and the 
proportion  uninsured  increases  by  5.7  percentage  points.
19  Regression  estimates  of  this 
change, however, understate the true size of the reduction in the percentage insured. This 
attenuation bias stems from the decrease in visits (apparent in the analysis below) that occurs 
as the newly uninsured become less likely to visit the ED. 
 
The estimates in Figure 5 come from the sample analog of the following equation: 
 
(3)       
 
where Di is an insurance coverage indicator and A i is age. The quantity   represents the 
discrete change in the proportion insured that occurs at age 19 among people visiting the 
emergency department. However,   is a biased estimate of the true reduction in insurance 
coverage because   is estimated from a population that is more likely to be 
uninsured and thus less likely to visit the ED. The population of ED visitors post-19 is 
therefore not comparable to the population of ED visitors pre-19.
20 
 
Under standard RD assumptions we can adjust our estimates of the first stage to estimate 
population-level parameters of interest. Suppose that Di(1) and Yi(1) indicate whether an 
individual is insured and whether they visit the ED, respectively, when they are older than 
                                                 
18 The proportion with private, Medicaid and no coverage in the ED data are (0.42, 0.25, 0.25). In the general 
population estimates from the NHIS, they are (0.62, 0.10, 0.20).  In the NHIS estimates restricted to people 
with a visit to the emergency department in the past year, they are (0.53, 0.19, 0.18). 
19 These estimates are robust to choice of bandwidth, as can be seen in Appendix 12. 
20 These issues would not affect our estimates if we had population-level estimates of the first-stage equation. 
The sample size of the NHIS, however, is too small to generate a precise estimate of the first-stage effect of 
age 19 on insurance coverage when restricted to the states for which we have ED visit data.   12 
19. The indicator functions Di(0) and Yi(0) are defined similarly for individuals younger than 
19. We would like to estimate: 
 
(4)        . 
 
That  is,  we  wish  to  measure  the  change  in  the  probability  of  being  insured  at  age  19 
conditional on visiting the ED before age 19. Instead, what we observe in the data is: 
 
(5)        . 
 
We observe the share insured, but for two distinct populations: those who visit the ED after 
they turn 19 and those who visit the ED before they turn 19. These two populations are not 
directly  comparable  because,  as  we  document  below,  insurance  coverage  affects  the 
probability that a person receives treatment in the ED. We correct for the bias in our first-
stage estimates under the assumption that the net change in observed ED visits at age 19 is 
driven only by individuals who lose insurance coverage. This assumption is implied by the 
standard IV exclusion restriction. 
 
We adopt the following notation for counts of visits and insured patients: y0 indicates visits 
made before age 19, d0 indicates number of insured patients younger than 19, and y1 and d1 
are defined similarly for patients older than age 19. The ratios   and   thus represent the 
fraction of insured ED patients before and after 19 respectively. We show in Appendix A 
that the following bias-corrected estimator converges to the quantity of interest: 
 
(6)    . 
 
Intuitively, the term (y0 – y1) “adds back in” the individuals who stop visiting the ED because 
they lose insurance coverage. We thus consistently estimate the average change in insurance 
coverage for individuals who visit the ED prior to turning 19. Translating equation (6) into 
RD quantities yields a bias-corrected first-stage equation of:   13 
 
(7)       
 
In practice, these quantities are estimated via local linear regressions in which the dependent 
variables are observed insurance status or ED visit rates. The samples for these regressions 
are limited to be either one year less than age 19 (for  ) or one year greater than age 19 
(for  ). We estimate the sample analogs of the elements of this equation along with the 
corresponding variance-covariance matrix via Seemingly Unrelated Regression.
21 We then 
estimate the standard errors via the Delta Method. 
 
In Table 4 we present estimates of the change in insurance coverage at age 19, adjusting for 
the bias described above. We estimate a 3.3 percent reduction in admissions at age 19 (see 
Table 5), and this effect shifts the estimated change in the proportion privately insured from 
–5.0 percentage points to –6.3 percentage points. It also shifts the estimated change in the 
proportion uninsured from 5.7 percentage points to 8.1 percentage points. The drop in 
private  insurance  coverage  is  complemented  by a  1 .7  percentage  point  reduction  in  the 
proportion of people covered by Medicaid.
22 The table also presents estimates for men and 
women separately and reveals that men and women experience similarly sized reductions in 
insurance coverage. 
 
Figure 6 presents the age profile of the rate of emergency department visits per 10,000 
person years. The figure reveals that the rates are increasing throughout this age range for 
both men and women. The figure also reveals evidence of a discrete reduction in treatment 
at age 19.
23 In the first column of Table 5 we present the regression estimate of the discrete 
                                                 
21 The corresponding bias-corrected first stage estimator for the increase in the proportion uninsured at age 19 
is  , where Ui equals one if individual i is uninsured and zero 
otherwise. 
22 As can be seen in Appendix 13, the estimated magnitudes of the changes in insurance coverage are similar 
across the five states included in the sample. In addition this table reveals that in three states (Iowa, New Jersey, 
and Wisconsin) people are aging out of Medicaid at 19. 
23 As a falsification test, we run similar specifications for ED visits at age 20 and find no evidence of either a 
break in insurance coverage or a change in admissions. These results of this analysis are presented in Appendix   14 
change in the natural log of admissions at age 19 for the entire population and for men and 
women separately. The regressions reveal that men and women experience a 3.3 percent 
decrease in visits.
 24 Non-pregnant women experience a slightly higher 3.6 percent decrease 
in visits. In Figure 7 we present the age profile of emergency department visits by hospital 
type. The figure shows substantial decreases in the number of people treated in emergency 
departments in non-profit hospitals and for-profit hospitals but no evidence of any decrease 
in the number of people treated in public hospitals. The corresponding regression estimates 
are in the second through fourth columns of Table 5. The two classes of privately-controlled 
hospitals account for almost the entire reduction in the number of people treated.
25 
 
The reduced-form estimates in Table 5 measure the average change in the probability of 
visiting the ED at age 19 (see Appendix A). If we assume that losing insurance weakly affects 
individuals’ propensity to visit the ED in one direction,
 26 then the reduced-form coefficients 
estimate the average causal effect of insurance (Di) for individuals that visit the ED before 
age 19 and are “compliers” (i.e., lose insurance when turning 19), multiplied by the first-stage 
estimand (see Appendix A): 
 
(8)  . 
 
                                                                                                                                                
24. We do not perform similar tests at age 18 because it is the age of majority or at age 21 because it is the age 
at which people are allowed to start purchasing alcohol. 
24 These estimates are fairly robust to bandwidth choice, as can be seen in Appendix 14. In addition the 
estimates for each of the five states in the sample are not significantly different than the overall estimate of      
–3.3, as can be seen in Appendix 15. 
25 This is not necessarily evidence of a violation of the Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active 
Labor Act, a federal law that mandates that EDs treat all individuals needing emergency treatment, regardless 
of ability to pay. It may be that that people choose not to go to the emergency department, decline treatment 
when they are informed that they lack insurance, or present with conditions that are not emergencies. 
26 The additional “monotonicity” assumption that losing insurance weakly affects individuals’ propensity to 
visit the ED in one direction is not guaranteed to hold. It is possible that losing insurance induces some people 
to stop visiting the ED but induces others to start. Our reduced-form estimates indicate that the former group 
dominates the latter group, but the latter group may nevertheless exist. Relaxing the additional monotonicity 
assumption (referred to as “Extended Monotonicity” in Appendix A), we show that the reduced form estimates 
a weighted average causal effect for two groups: compliers that visit the ED before age 19 and compliers that 
visit the ED after age 19 (see Appendix A). We derive a modified first-stage estimator that converges to the 
sum  of  the  reduced-form  weights.  Under  reasonable  assumptions,  we  establish  a  lower  bound  on  the 
magnitude of the average effect of losing insurance on ED visits for compliers that could potentially visit the 
ED. This lower bound is 0.364, as compared to the estimate of 0.404 reported in this section. Relaxing the 
Extended Monotonicity assumption thus does not qualitatively change our conclusions.   15 
We can thus estimate the impact of insurance coverage on the use of emergency department 
services by dividing the estimates of the percent change in admissions from Table 5 by the 
estimates of the percentage point change in insurance coverage rates from Table 4. This ratio 
estimates the expected reduction in ED utilization for individuals that visit the ED before 
age 19 and are compliers. These elasticities are presented in Table 6. The estimate for the 
overall population is –0.404, implying that individuals that lose their insurance coverage 
reduce  their  emergency  department  visits  by  40 p e r c e n t .
27  The  reductions  for  men  and 
women are very similar. 
 
6.  THE EFFECTS OF HEALTH INSURANCE ON INPATIENT ADMISSIONS 
 
Inpatient  visits  to  the  hospital  are  less  common  than  ED  visits.  Among  young  adults, 
approximately 6 percent have had an inpatient admission in the past year. Nevertheless, such 
visits are expensive; approximately 34 percent of total health care spending is driven by 
inpatient  admissions.
28  As  such,  the  effect  of  insurance  coverage  on  inpatient  visits  is  a 
critical object of interest. 
 
To examine the impact of insurance coverage on hospital admissions, we use a census of 
hospital  discharges  from  six s t a t e s :  Arizona,  California,  Iowa,  New  York,  Texas,  and 
Wisconsin.
29 Between the six states we observe a total of 849,610 hospital visits among 18 
and 19 year olds. These records contain the same demographic variables available in the ED 
data along with detailed information on the cause of admission and treatment received in the 
hospital. 
 
We analyze changes in inpatient visits separately for men, pregnant women, and women who 
are not pregnant. Among young adults, approximately 9.1 percent of women and 2.4 percent 
of men have an inpatient hospitalization in any given year. The gender difference is almost 
                                                 
27 As can be seen in Appendix 16, the estimates of the elasticity across the five states in the sample range from  
-0.586 to -0.191. 
28 Authors’ own calculations from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. 
29 The hospital records include discharges occurring in the following time periods and states: 2000–2007 in 
Arizona, 1990–2006 in California, 1990–2006 in New York, 2004–2007 in Iowa, 1999–2003 in Texas and 
2004–2007 in Wisconsin. Discharges from hospitals that are not regulated by the states’ departments of health 
services are not included amongst these records.   16 
entirely  due  to  admissions  of  pregnant  women.  Women  who  are  pregnant  are  generally 
provided with public insurance through Medicaid and thus have a different insurance-age 
profile than the other two groups. Since there is no change in the proportion uninsured for 
pregnant women at age 19 (see Table 7), we eliminate these women from our graphical 
analysis. 
 
Figure 8 presents the age profile of insurance coverage for males and non-pregnant females 
admitted to a hospital. The figure reveals that the proportion of individuals with private 
insurance drops with age, while the proportion uninsured or covered by Medicaid increases 
with age. Overall, the proportion uninsured is far lower than the levels observed in either the 
general population (as estimated using the NHIS data) or in the population of visitors to the 
ED. The figure also reveals a decline in private coverage at exactly age 19. This decline is 
matched by an increase in the proportion uninsured or covered by Medicaid at the same 
age.
30 Note, however, that the increase in proportion covered by Medicaid is primarily an 
artifact of the decrease in the total number of inpatient admissions at age 19.
31 
 
These estimates of the change in insurance coverage at age 19 are biased by a change in 
composition similar to the one that affects the ED estimates. The first row of Table 7 
presents estimates of the discrete change in insurance coverage that occurs at age 19 for the 
overall inpatient population (including pregnant women), corrected for bias in the manner 
described in the prior section. The estimates reveal that among all admissions, approximately 
41 percent of the loss in private coverage is offset by increases in Medicaid coverage, so that 
the proportion uninsured increases by only 2.7 percentage points.
32 Most of the increase in 
Medicaid coverage, however, is concentrated among pregnant women. The other rows of 
Table 7 present estimates by gender, separating women into pregnant and non-pregnant. 
These  estimates  reveal  that,  for  men,  aging  out  of  private  insurance  results  in  a 6 . 3 
percentage  point  increase  in  the  proportion  that  are  uninsured.  Women  who a r e  n o t  
                                                 
30 As can be inferred from the linear age profiles in Figure 8 and can be seen directly in Appendix 17, the 
estimates of the change in insurance coverage are robust to the choice of bandwidth. 
31 The conclusion that there is little increase in the proportion covered by Medicaid at age 19 (except among 
pregnant women) is supported by the NHIS and ED results, both of which reveal small declines in Medicaid 
coverage at age 19. 
32 As can be seen in Appendix 18, the increase in the proportion uninsured is between 2.5 and 3 percentage 
points in four of the six states in the sample.   17 
pregnant  experience  an  approximately  5.0  percentage  point  increase  in  the  proportion 
uninsured. There is little increase in the proportion covered by Medicaid within these two 
groups.
33 Pregnant women, however, experience little change in the proportion uninsured.
34 
For them, Medicaid absorbs most of the loss in private insurance coverage. 
 
In Figure 9 we present the age profile of hospital admissions for men and non-pregnant 
women by the route through which they are admitted to the hospital. The figure reveals only 
a small decline in admissions through the emergency department after people lose their 
insurance coverage. Many of these admissions are for medical conditions that are emergent 
and may be less sensitive to price. It is also likely that many of these admissions are subject 
to  the  Federal  Emergency  Medical  Treatment  and  Active  Labor  Act.  We  see  more 
substantial  drops  in  admissions  directly  to  the  hospital.  These  admissions  are  typically 
planned admissions and may be elective. In Table 8 we present estimates of the change in 
the natural log of admissions at age 19, estimated from equation (2). The table reveals that 
inpatient admissions through the emergency department drop by about 2 percent for men 
and 1 percent for non-pregnant women. Inpatient admissions directly to the hospital drop 
by  6.7  percent  for  men  and  6.0  percent  for  women.
35,36  Pregnant  women  exhibit  no 
statistically significant change in hospital admissions. In the bottom three rows of the table 
we present the estimates of the change in hospital admissions by ownership type. There is a 
1.4 percent decrease in admissions to non-profit hospitals and a 4.0 percent decrease in 
                                                 
33 One of the primary contributions of this paper is that it isolates the effects of uninsured status, avoiding 
substantial contamination by transitions from private to public insurance. It is thus instructive to compare these 
“first-stage” results to the “first-stage” results in Card et al. (2008). Among males, the change in uninsured 
individuals at age 19 is 8.7 times larger than the change in Medicaid-covered individuals. Among non-pregnant 
females, the change in uninsured individuals at age 19 is 4.1 times larger than the change in Medicaid-covered 
individuals. In Card et al. (2008), the change in uninsured individuals at age 65 is 6.3 times smaller than the 
change in Medicare-covered individuals. Thus the private-to-public “contamination problem” is one to two 
orders of magnitude smaller in this paper than it is in Card et al. (2008). 
34 Most hospitals try to enroll people that are uninsured when they present at the hospital in Medicaid so that 
they can recover the cost of treating them. Pregnant women are much more likely to qualify for Medicaid than 
men or non-pregnant women. 
35 Almost all of the reduction in inpatient admissions comes through scheduled admissions, which suggests that 
the  Extended  Monotonicity  assumption  is  unlikely  to  be  violated  in  the  inpatient  analysis.  The  Extended 
Monotonicity assumption could plausibly be violated in the ED data because a lack of primary care might cause 
a non-serious condition to develop into an emergent condition, necessitating a visit to the ED. However, most 
of the reduction in inpatient admissions comes through scheduled admissions, which are unlikely to result from 
emergent conditions. We thus conclude that there is no substantial violation of the Extended Monotonicity 
assumption in the inpatient data. 
36 As can be inferred from Figure 9 and seen directly in Appendices 19 and 20, these estimates are robust to 
bandwidth choice. As can be seen in Appendix 21, the estimates vary somewhat across states. The largest 
reduction in visits is observed in Wisconsin, which also has the largest first-stage effect.   18 
admissions to for profit-hospitals. There is no evidence, however, of a change in overall 
admissions to hospitals under public control. 
 
In  Table  9  we  present  the  instrumental  variables  estimates  of  the  impact  of  insurance 
coverage on the probability of an inpatient admission. The estimate for men is –0.61 and for 
non-pregnant  women  is  –0.66,  implying  that  losing  insurance  coverage  reduces  the 
probability  of  an  inpatient  admission  by  61  percent  for  men  and  66  percent  for  non-
pregnant  women.
37 T h e s e  estimates  are  even  larger  than  the  estimates  for  emergency 
department  visits  and  suggest  that  insurance  coverage  is  an  important  determinant  of 
whether people will receive inpatient treatment. When we examine the results by route into 
the hospital, it is clear that the overall drop in admissions is due largely to the large decline in 
admissions directly to the hospital, which are typically elective admissions. 
 
7.  DISCUSSION 
 
Three  issues  affect  the  generalizability  of  our  regression  discontinuity  results.  First,  the 
estimates  are  local  average  treatment  effects  based  on  the  response  of  the  “compliers”, 
individuals who become uninsured upon turning 19. Second, the estimates are based only on 
young  adults.  Third,  the  estimates  represent  the  short-run  response  to  uninsured  status 
rather than the long-run response. We examine each of these issues below. 
 
7.1 LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS 
 
As  with  all  instrumental  variables  designs,  the  estimates  reported  above  represent  local 
average treatment effects; they capture the average effect of uninsured status for individuals 
who  lose  coverage  at  age  19.  These  individuals  differ  from  the  typical  19  year  old  in 
numerous ways. For example, they are much less likely to attend college (see Figures 2 and 
3). Nevertheless, the estimates recover information that is useful for policy makers because 
the compliers make up a substantial fraction of total uninsured 19 year olds. 
 
                                                 
37 As  s e e n i n Appe ndi x 22,  t he  e s t i ma t e s  va r y  s ome wha t  a c r os s  s t a t e s ,  t houg h a l l  t he  pr e c i s e l y  e s t i ma t e d 
elasticities fall between -0.84 and -0.48.   19 
For policy purposes, the parameter of interest is the average effect of insurance coverage for 
the currently uninsured. The compliers constitute less than 10 percent of total 19 year olds 
but a much larger share of uninsured 19 year olds. The discontinuities in the NHIS data 
suggest that almost 20 percent of uninsured 19-year-olds are compliers, and the fraction 
compliers is even higher in the ED and inpatient data (roughly 25 to 30 percent of uninsured 
in either case).
38 Furthermore, the age-out mechanism itself affects an even larger fraction of 
uninsured  19  year  olds.  Nearly  30  percent  of  uninsured  19-year-old  NHIS  respondents 
report having lost insurance due to age or leaving school, and the total proportion uninsured 
roughly triples from age 16 to age 22. This suggests that a large fraction of all uninsured 
young adults have lost insurance in a similar manner. 
 
Of course, a portion of uninsured 19 year olds did not lose insurance through the age out 
mechanism, and our estimates do not apply directly to them. These chronically uninsured 
individuals are, in the language of Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996), “never-takers.” In 
most  health  insurance  contexts,  a  central  concern  is  that  insurance  coverage  choice  is 
intimately  related  to  underlying  health;  the  chronically  uninsured  (never-takers)  may 
therefore  be  significantly  healthier  than  the  recently  uninsured  (compliers).  Such  a 
relationship would diminish the response of never-takers to insurance coverage relative to 
compliers. In this case, however, it is unlikely that adverse selection causes a significant 
divergence in the mean health of never-takers and compliers. This is because the compliers’ 
pre-19  insurance  coverage  is  an  artifact  of  their  parents’  insurance  plans  rather  than  a 
reflection of their own poor health (if it were not, they would not drop coverage immediately 
after  turning  19).  The  typical  adverse  selection  mechanism  thus  does  not  apply  in  this 
context. 
 
Moreover, we find no evidence that never-takers are significantly less healthy or consume 
less  health  care  than  uninsured  compliers.  To  test  for  any  differences,  we  first  use  the 
Medical  Expenditure  Panel  Survey  (MEPS),  a  two-year  panel  survey  of  health  care 
                                                 
38 In the NHIS data, we observe a 4.1 percentage point increase in the share uninsured at age 19. Roughly 20 
percent of 18-year-olds in the NHIS are uninsured. In the ED and inpatient data, we observe increases in the 
share uninsured at age 19 of 8.1 percentage points and 2.7 percentage points respectively. Roughly 21.5 percent 
of 18-year-olds in the ED data are uninsured, and roughly 7.6 percent of 18-year-olds in the inpatient data are 
uninsured.   20 
consumption. We isolate respondents who enter the survey at age 18 with insurance and 
then lose insurance during the second year of the survey. Such respondents are likely to be 
“compliers.”  We  compare  these  respondents  to  respondents  likely  to  be  never-takers.
39 
Though there are few such respondents in the survey, we find no significant differences in 
either self-reported health or total expenditures in the second year of the survey (when both 
compliers and never-takers are uninsured).
40 
 
We confirm the null result in the MEPS with a similar exercise using NHIS data. We isolate 
all NHIS respondents who are between 18 and 20 years of age and report being uninsured. 
Using that selected sample, we test for a discontinuity at age 19 in the share of uninsured 
respondents who report to be in bad health or report a functional limitation that prevents 
them from certain activities. Such a regression discontinuity would suggest a sudden change 
in the composition of the uninsured at age 19.
41 We find no such discontinuity, confirming 
our  results  from  the  MEPS.  Overall,  we  find  no  evidence  of  significant  compositional 
differences between the compliers and the never-takers. 
 
7.2 AGE-SPECIFIC TREATMENT EFFECTS 
 
All regression discontinuity designs estimate treatment effects at a particular threshold. In 
this case, our estimates apply specifically to individuals close to their 19
th birthday, though 
they are likely to generalize to young adults in their late teens or early twenties.
42 Older 
individuals may react differently to a loss of health insurance. On the one hand, the overall 
                                                 
39 Such respondents are 18 years old at the end of the first survey year, and uninsured during both the first and 
second years of the survey. 
40 Specifically, we find 318 respondents who are “likely compliers” and compare them to 1,070 respondents 
who are consistently uninsured (never-takers). In a comparison of means, likely compliers are 5.1 percentage 
points less likely to report being in good health. This difference is statistically insignificant (t-statistic of 1.06) 
and small relative to the proportion of consistently uninsured 18–20 year olds that report being in good health 
(48.0 percent). Likely compliers also consume 43.61 dollars per year more in health care once uninsured. This 
difference  is  again  statistically  insignificant  (t-statistic  of  0.24)  and  small  relative  to  the  mean  health  care 
consumption of consistently uninsured 18–20 year olds (681.46 dollars per year). 
41 For physical limitations, we estimate a statistically insignificant discontinuity of 0.000 (t-statistic of 0.00). The 
mean of the physical limitations variable for 18–20 year olds is 0.036. For bad health, we estimate a statistically 
insignificant discontinuity of 0.010 (t-statistic of 1.00). The mean of the bad health variable for 18–20 year olds 
is 0.042. 
42 In Appendix 23 we present the estimates of the discrete change in insurance and ED treatment rates that 
occurs at age 23 when individuals that are still in school age out of their parents’ insurance. The change in 
insurance  coverage  at  age  23  is  smaller  than  the  one  at  age  19,  but  the  difference  between  the  elasticity 
estimated at age 19 and the one estimated at age 23 is not statistically significant.   21 
utilization of EDs and hospitals is relatively stable until at least age 50 (Figure 1). On the 
other hand, older adults are susceptible to different medical conditions and may have greater 
financial resources than uninsured young adults. These factors could affect their response to 
the provision of health insurance. 
 
We can only speculate as to how the estimates for 19-year-olds translate to the general 
population. Nevertheless, simple “back-of-the-envelope” calculations suggest that even if the 
behavioral response estimated above is twice as large as the average response, our results still 
imply  that  universal  coverage  would  lead  to  substantial  increases  in  utilization.  In  2005, 
uninsured individuals constituted 16.7 percent of ED visits and 7.2 percent of inpatient stays 
(Nawar, Niska, and Xu 2007; DeFrances, Cullen, and Kozak 2007). Suppose therefore that 
universal coverage generates a 17 percentage point reduction in the share uninsured in EDs 
and a 7 percentage point reduction in the share uninsured in hospitals. If the elasticities that 
we estimate for 19-year-olds apply directly to the general population, then universal coverage 
would generate an 11.4 percent increase in ED visits and an 11 percent increase in inpatient 
visits. Such an increase, at present levels, amounts to an additional 13.1 million ED visits and 
3.8 million inpatient hospital stays each year. Even if our estimates are twice as large as the 
average response to uninsured status, universal coverage would generate an additional 6.6 
million ED visits and 1.9 million inpatient hospital stays each year. Supply constraints might 
attenuate an overall increase of this magnitude; however, in that case prices would likely rise 
as well. 
 
7.3 SHORT RUN AND LONG RUN EFFECTS 
 
Our results represent the short-run response to a change in health insurance coverage. The 
short-run response, however, may differ from the long-run response for three reasons. First, 
individuals may shift the timing of health care visits across the age 19 threshold. Second, 
individuals may be able to postpone consumption in the short run but not in the long run. 
Third, a reduction in preventative care visits may have no impact in the short run but could 
increase demand for health care in the long run. 
   22 
The short time horizon in our study may allow individuals to shift the timing of health care 
visits from the uninsured period to the insured period. When losing insurance, individuals 
may  “stockpile”  health  care  shortly  before  coverage  expires.  When  gaining  insurance, 
individuals may postpone health care until shortly after coverage begins. In either case, the 
regression  discontinuity  we  document  would  be  confounded  by  such  behavior.  The 
estimates  would  reflect  the  inter-temporal  substitution  response  to  a  sharp,  anticipated 
change in health care prices and would overstate the net change in health care consumption. 
 
However, there exists little evidence that individuals shift the timing of health care visits in 
anticipation  of  gaining  or  losing  insurance  coverage.  In  an  analysis  of  private  insurance 
claims records, Gross (2010) finds no evidence that teenagers who lose coverage at age 19 
consume  more  hospital  visits  or  prescription  medication  in  the  weeks  before  they  lose 
coverage.  Card  et  al.  (2008)  find  no  evidence  that  individuals  nearing  age  65  postpone 
inpatient care in significant numbers until they qualify for Medicare, and Long et al. (1998) 
find little evidence of health care stockpiling for the general population. Additionally, the 
figures of ED and inpatient visits above do not exhibit an increase in consumption in the 
months immediately before people turn 19. 
 
A similar estimation problem may arise if individuals postpone care in the hopes of regaining 
coverage. If newly uninsured 19-year-olds expect to regain insurance coverage within the 
next  six  months,  for  example,  they  may  postpone  care  until  that  point.  The  empirical 
evidence suggests that this dynamic is not present, however. The age profiles in ED and 
inpatient  care  utilization  (Figures  6,  7,  and  9)  show  no  evidence  of  postponement.  If 
individuals were postponing care immediately after losing coverage, then we would expect 
the slope of the age profile to become steeper after age 19. Instead, in every case the slope of 
the age profile becomes less steep after age 19. 
 
Finally, the RD approach isolates individuals who are insured one day and uninsured the 
next. As a result, it provides estimates of the effect of health insurance independent from the 
effect of insurance on health itself. In the long run, though, insults to health accumulate, care 
may become more critical, and individuals may become less price sensitive. In that case, our 
estimates could overstate the long-run increase in care that would ensue from an expansion   23 
of health insurance coverage. While the long run effect of health insurance on health is an 
important research question, it is beyond the scope of this paper. To our knowledge, little 
convincing evidence exists that can quantify the extent to which coverage affects health in 
the long run. 
 
Nevertheless, a substantial share of the uninsured are without coverage for a short period of 
time. Among the currently uninsured, 25 percent have been uninsured for less than one year, 
and 45 percent have been uninsured for less than three years.
43 Our estimates apply directly 
to this large group of the “recently uninsured.” 
 
8.  CONCLUSION 
 
We leverage a sharp discontinuity in health insurance coverage that occurs when dependents 
age out of their parents’ insurance plans at age 19. By exploiting that discontinuity, we 
estimate the effects of health insurance coverage on utilization of care. We find that losing 
health  insurance  coverage  reduces  utilization  of  both  emergency  department  care  and 
inpatient care. The estimated responses are large – a 10 percentage point decrease in the 
insurance coverage rate among ED patients reduces ED visits by 4.0 percent, and a 10 
percentage point decrease in the insurance coverage rate among hospital patients reduces 
hospital visits by 6.1 percent. The reduction in hospital visits is stronger for non-urgent 
admissions, and the reductions in ED and hospital visits are concentrated among for-profit 
and non-profit hospitals, as opposed to public hospitals. 
 
The net effect of losing health insurance on utilization of care is unambiguously negative for 
our study population. The results clarify several uncertainties about the impacts of insurance 
coverage on utilization of care. First, losing insurance coverage results in a net decrease in 
emergency department care. This suggests that newly uninsured patients do not substitute 
emergency  department  care  for  primary  care  (or,  if  they  do  substitute  care  towards  the 
emergency  department,  the  substituted  care  is  swamped  by  a  reduction  in  their  normal 
                                                 
43 These calculations are based on the NHIS. Note that the proportion of uninsured spells that are short-term 
is even larger than the proportion of currently uninsured individuals who will be short-term uninsured. Cutler 
and Gelber (2009) find, for example, that from 2001 to 2004, 76 percent of uninsured spells last less than two 
years among 18 to 61 year olds.   24 
emergency  department  visits).  Second,  any  increase  in  uncompensated  charity  care  is 
insufficient to offset the decrease in paid care, as total ED and inpatient care both fall. 
Finally,  losing  insurance  does  increase  the  proportion  of  care  that  individuals  receive  at 
public hospitals. However, this increase is solely due to a decrease in care received at for-
profit  and  non-profit  hospitals.  The  total  amount  of  care  at  public  hospitals  does  not 
increase. 
 
Our results apply specifically to young adults that lose insurance coverage by aging out of 
their  parents’  insurance  plans.  Nevertheless,  evidence  suggests  that  the  coefficients  may 
generalize  to  the  greater  population  of  uninsured  young  adults,  and  19  to  35  year  olds 
comprise over half of uninsured non-elderly adults. Applying our estimated elasticities to all 
non-elderly adults, we project that near-universal coverage could raise total hospital stays by 
3.8 million per year and ED visits by 13.1 million per year, subject to supply constraints. 
Near-universal  coverage  would  thus  increase  the  amount  of  care  received  by  currently 
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9.  APPENDIX A: ECONOMETRIC THEORY 
 
In this appendix, we present the derivation of the empirical methods that we rely on above. 
First, recall that our reduced-form regressions involve the logarithm of counts of hospital 
visits on the left-hand side, and a first-order polynomial of age on the right-hand side (with 
the sample restricted to individuals within one year of their 19
th birthdays). This specification 
recovers the population-level change in the probability of visiting the hospital at age 19. In 
particular, note that the structural relationship of interest is: 
 
(A1)      . 
 
The left-hand side of equation (A1) represents the probability of having a hospital visit for 
age group a (that is, the total number of visits divided by the total number of individuals in 
the population of age a). Since we rely on administrative records, we do not observe the size 
of each age group in the underlying population. Instead, we assume that the underlying 
population at risk for a hospital visit evolves smoothly with age. Under this assumption, we 
can subtract   from each side of the equation and allow the polynomial   to 
“absorb” changes in the size of the underlying population. In this way, our primary reduced-
form estimating equation involves only simple counts of hospital visits but still captures the 
change in the unconditional probability of a hospital visit at age 19. 
 
The description above justifies our reduced-form approach. But, as described in the main 
text,  a  remaining  challenge  is  to  consistently  estimate  both  the  first  stage  and  the 
instrumental variables relationships using hospital administrative data. To do so, we rely on a 
bias  correction  in  the  first  stage  and  an  additional  monotonicity  assumption  when 
interpreting the instrumental variables relationship. We demonstrate that, when applied to 
the ED data, the bias-corrected instrumental variables estimator converges to the average 
effect of insurance for individuals that lose their insurance coverage at age 19 and visit the 
ED shortly before age 19.   30 
 
9.1 NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Define the instrument Zi such that   if individual i is encouraged to be uninsured (i.e., is 
older than the age cutoff threshold) and   if individual i is encouraged to be insured 
(i.e., is younger than the age cutoff threshold). Define the insurance indicator Di such that 
 if individual i is insured and   if individual i is uninsured. Define the outcome Yi 
such that   if individual i visits the ED and   if individual i does not visit the ED.
44 
Using  the  potential  outcomes  notation  from  Angrist,  Imbens,  and  Rubin  (1996),  define 
Di(Zi) such that Di(1) represents the insurance status of individual i when encouraged to be 
uninsured and Di(0) represents the insurance status of individual i when encouraged to be 
insured. Note that the relationship between Di and Zi is negative. Define potential outcomes 
Yi(Zi) such that Yi(1) represents the ED visit indicator for individual i when encouraged to 
be uninsured and Yi(0) represents the ED visit indicator for individual i when encouraged to 
be insured. To represent potential outcomes under different insurance regimes, Yi(Di), let 
 represent the ED visit indicator for individual i when insured and   
represent the ED visit indicator for individual i when uninsured. Finally, define y0 to be the 
total number of ED visits pre-19 (i.e., for individuals with  ), y1 to be the total number 
of ED visits post-19 (i.e., for individuals with  ), d0 to be the total number of insured 
ED visits pre-19 (i.e., for individuals with  ), and d1 to be the total number of insured 
ED  visits  post-19  (i.e.,  for  individuals  with  ).  Let  N  be  the  total  population  of 
individuals (both those that visit the ED and those that do not visit the ED). 
 
We impose the standard LATE monotonicity assumption: 
 
LATE Monotonicity: If  , then  . 
 
In other words, if individual i is insured when encouraged to be uninsured, then individual i 
would also be insured when encouraged to be insured. We define the four potential types of 
individuals under the LATE Monotonicity assumption as: 
                                                 
44 For the following derivations, we assume that the RD bandwidth is small enough that the probability of any 
individual visiting the ED twice is effectively zero.   31 
 
LATE Always-takers (LAT):   and   
LATE Never-takers (LNT):   and   
LATE Compliers (LC):   and   
LATE Defiers:   and   (ruled out by LATE Monotonicity) 
 
We also impose an Extended Monotonicity assumption that we later relax: 
 
Extended Monotonicity: If  , then  . 
 
In  other  words,  if  individual  i  visits  the  ED  when  encouraged  to  be  uninsured,  then 
individual  i  would  also  visit  the  ED  when  encouraged  to  be  insured.  Given  the  LATE 
Monotonicity assumption, this assumption is equivalent to assuming that if individual i visits 
the ED when uninsured, then individual i would also visit the ED when insured. We define 
the four potential types of individuals under the Extended Monotonicity assumption as: 
 
Extended Always-takers (EAT):   and   
Extended Never-takers (ENT):   and   
Extended Compliers (EC):   and   
Extended Defiers (EDF):   and   (ruled out by Extended Monotonicity) 
 
9.1.1  BIAS-CORRECTED FIRST STAGE 
 
We first derive the bias-corrected first stage. Ideally we would estimate  , or the 
unconditional change in the probability of insurance coverage. However, it is impossible to 
estimate this quantity using ED data alone, since individuals only appear in these data if they 
visit the ED. We instead estimate  , or the change in the probability of 
insurance coverage for individuals that visit the ED when encouraged to be insured (i.e., pre-
19). Under the LATE Monotonicity assumption,   32 
;  the  decrease  in  the  probability  of 
insurance  coverage  is  equal  to  the  proportion  of  LATE  compliers.  To  estimate 
, we implement the bias-corrected first stage: 
 
(A2)         
 










By the IV exclusion restriction and the definitions of LATE always-takers, LATE never-
takers, and LATE compliers: 
 
i is LAT implies:   and   
i is LNT implies:   and   
i is LC implies:   and   
 
Thus equation (A3) equals: 
 






The bias-corrected first stage therefore estimates the probability that an individual is a LATE 
complier conditional on that individual visiting the ED when encouraged to be insured (i.e., 
pre-19). Equivalently, it represents a weighted average effect of the age 19 threshold on 
insurance coverage rates, where the weight for individual i is proportional to that individual’s 
probability of visiting the ED just before turning 19. Note that the Extended Monotonicity 
assumption is not necessary to derive the bias-corrected first stage estimand. 
 
9.1.2  REDUCED FORM 
 
We estimate the percentage decline in visits induced by the instrument (i.e., crossing the “age 
out” threshold). The reduced form is: 
 
(A5)         
 
 






By Law of Total Probability: 
 
 
   34 











By Extended Monotonicity,   implies  , so 
. Thus equation (A6) equals: 
 
   
(A7)   
 
By definition of LATE compliers,   implies  , and   implies  . Thus 




Under the Extended Monotonicity assumption, the reduced form thus estimates the average 
causal effect of losing insurance on ED visits for LATE compliers that visit the ED pre-19 
(i.e., with  ) times the probability of being a LATE complier conditional on visiting   35 
the  ED  pre-19.  For  completeness,  note  that    equals 
. 
 
9.1.3  INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATOR 
 
The instrumental variables estimator (of which the fuzzy RD is a special case) equals the 
reduced-form estimator shown in equation (A5) divided by the bias-corrected first-stage 
estimator shown in equation (A2). It thus converges to: 
 
 
   
 
Thus,  under  the  Extended  Monotonicity  assumption,  the  IV  coefficient  estimates  the 
average effect of Di on Yi for the subset of LATE compliers that visit the ED when   
(i.e., that visit the ED pre-19). This is equivalent to a weighted average effect for the entire 
population of compliers, where the weights are proportional to the probability of visiting the 
ED pre-19. 
 
9.2 RELAXING THE EXTENDED MONOTONICITY ASSUMPTION 
 
The  Extended  Monotonicity  assumption  implies  that  losing  insurance  weakly  affects 
individuals’ propensity to visit the ED in one direction. This assumption is not guaranteed to 
hold in the ED data; it is possible that losing insurance induces some people to stop visiting 
the ED but induces others to start. (The Extended Monotonicity assumption more plausibly 
holds in the inpatient data used in Section 6; see footnote 35.) We now derive the reduced-
form estimand while relaxing the Extended Monotonicity assumption. We then derive the 
modified first stage that is necessary to rescale the reduced-form estimand. 
 
9.2.1  REDUCED FORM 
   36 
The reduced form is  , or the percentage decline in visits induced by the instrument. 





Note  the  convergence  of  the  reduced  form  to  equation  (A8)  does  not  depend  on  the 







(A9)   
 
 
Under LATE Monotonicity, the reduced form estimates a weighted sum of two average 
causal effects of Di on Yi. The first is the average causal effect of losing insurance for LATE 
compliers that visit the ED pre-19 (i.e., that have  ). The second is the average causal 
effect of losing insurance for LATE compliers that visit the ED post-19 (i.e., that have 
).  Note  that  these  two  groups  are  not  mutually  exclusive;  individuals  that  are 
“extended always-takers” appear in both groups. 
 
9.2.2  MODIFIED FIRST STAGE 
 
The goal of the modified first stage is to recover the weights in the reduced form above. The 
original bias-adjusted first stage converged to   (which is identical to the   37 
first of the two weights above). We modify the first stage so that it now estimates the sum of 
the two weights above. The modified first stage is: 
 
(A10)         
 
 
From the derivation of the original bias-adjusted first stage, the first term of equation (A10) 




The last term of equation (A10) converges to: 
 
 
   
 (A11) 
 
     
 
By the IV exclusion restriction and the definitions of LATE always-takers and LATE never-





The modified first stage shown in equation (A10) thus converges to: 
 




The modified first stage, equation (A10), therefore estimates the sum of the weights from 
the reduced form. 
 
9.2.3  MODIFIED INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATOR 
 
The modified instrumental variables estimator equals the reduced form estimator shown in 





Thus,  when  relaxing  the  Extended  Monotonicity  assumption,  the  modified  instrumental 
variables estimator converges to a weighted average of two average causal effects of Di on Yi. 
The first is the average causal effect of losing insurance for LATE compliers that visit the 
ED  pre-19  (i.e.,  that  have  ). T h e  s e c o n d   is  the  average  causal  effect  of  losing 
insurance for LATE compliers that visit the ED post-19 (i.e., that have  ). Note that 
these  two  groups  are n o t  mutually  exclusive.  In  particular,  both  groups  contain  LATE 
compliers that would visit the ED regardless of insurance status. Thus the average is skewed 
towards this group, but for this group insurance status has no causal effect on ED visits. The 
modified instrumental variables estimand is thus attenuated relative to the expected effect of 
increasing health insurance coverage for all LATE compliers. 
 
9.2.4  ESTIMATES FROM EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT DATA 
 
The modified first-stage, equation (A10), is equal to –0.126 in the ED data.
45 The modified 
first stage thus generates a modified IV estimate of 0.263, as compared to the original IV 
                                                 
45 We count privately insured patients, Medicaid patients, and “other insurance” patients as insured. Taking the 
estimates from Tables 5 and 6, equation (A10) thus equals 2*(–0.628 – 0.0166 –0.0015) + 0.033 = –0.126.   39 
estimate of 0.404. However, as noted in Section 9.2.3, this estimate is attenuated in the sense 
that it places double weight on individuals that visit the ED regardless of insurance status 
(“extended always-takers”), because for these individuals   and  . To see that 
these individuals receive double weight, note that the reduced form estimand, equation (A9), 

















The  extended  always-takers  (EAT)  appear  twice  because  they  visit  the  ED  both  when 
insured  and  uninsured.  By  definition,  however,   f o r   extended 
always-takers, so either of the conditional expectations involving extended always-takers can 







The reduced form therefore estimates a weighted average of three average causal effects: the 
average causal effect for LATE compliers who are extended always-takers, the average causal 
effect for LATE compliers who are “extended compliers” (individuals that visit the ED only 
when  insured),  and  the  average  causal  effect  for  LATE  compliers  who  are  “extended 
defiers” (individuals that visit the ED only when uninsured). These three mutually exclusive 
groups exhaust the population of LATE compliers that visit the ED. Each group’s weight is 
proportional to its share of LATE compliers that visit the ED either before or after age 19 
(i.e., LATE compliers who are not extended never-takers). With estimates of the weights in 
equation (A13), we can recover the average causal effect of insurance for LATE compliers 
that visit the ED before or after age 19. 
 
It is impossible, however, to identify exactly what portion of LATE compliers are extended 
always-takers versus extended compliers or extended defiers. But note that from equation 
(A4), the original bias-corrected first stage (equation (A2)) estimates 
, or the sum of the first two 
weights in equation (A13). As reported in Table 4, this quantity equals 0.081. Likewise, 
equations (A12) and (A4) imply that the difference between the modified bias-corrected first 
stage (equation (A10)) and the original bias-corrected first stage (equation (A2)) estimates 
  ,  or  the  sum  of  the  first 
and third weights in equation (A13). This quantity is 0.045 (given by 0.126 – 0.081 = 0.045). 
However,  equation  (A13)  has  three  unknown  quantities,  and  we  have  only  two  linearly 
independent estimates, equations (A2) and (A10). We must therefore make an additional 
assumption to derive a bound on the sum of the weights in equation (A13).   41 
 
To establish an upper bound (in magnitude) on the sum of the three weights in equation 
(A13), we make the reasonable assumption that the number of LATE compliers that stop 
visiting  the  ED  when  becoming  uninsured  (extended  compliers)  is  no  greater  than  the 
number of LATE compliers that either continue to visit the ED when becoming uninsured 
or begin visiting the ED when becoming uninsured (extended always-takers plus extended 
defiers). In other words, we assume that the number of newly uninsured that stop visiting 
the ED is no greater than the number of newly uninsured that continue visiting the ED plus 
the  number  of  newly  uninsured  that  begin  visiting  the  ED.  Under  this  assumption, 
 is at most 0.045, and thus   is at least 0.036 (given by 
0.081 – 0.045 = 0.036). We therefore adjust the modified first-stage estimator for double 
counting of extended always-takers by subtracting at least 0.036, and find that the modified 
first-stage estimator has an upper bound (in magnitude) of 0.090 (given by 0.126 – 0.036 = 
0.090). A modified first-stage of –0.090 generates a modified IV estimate of 0.364. We thus 
conclude that losing insurance coverage reduces the probability of an ED visit for LATE 

































Hospital Stay in Past 12 Months
Emergency Department Visit in Past 12 Months
Notes: These estimates are derived from the NHIS 1997-2007. Figure 2: Age Profile of Health Insurance Coverage in the United States 




































Notes: Regressions and proportions are weighted to take into account the stratified structure of the NHIS. The regression lines superimposed on the proportions are from a linear 
polynomial in age interacted with a dummy that takes on a value of one for people over 19 and 0 otherwise. This regression is fit on the micro data rather than the means of the bins. 
The age variable is centered on the last day of the month on which the individual's 19th birthday falls. Individuals with unknown month of birth comprise 11.1 percent of the surveyed 
population that are 18 or 19 at the time of the survey and they have been dropped from the analysis. The age profiles above include 24,260 individuals from the NHIS person files.
Other Insurance
Estimates of Size of Discontinuity in 
Insurance Coverage.
                           RD      (SE)
Private              -2.01    (1.31)
Uninsured          4.12    (1.12)
Medicaid           -1.00    (0.75)
Other Insur.      -1.15     (0.69)Figure 3: Age Profile of Proportion Uninsured by School Attendance



































Notes: See notes from Figure 2. As can be inferred from how the proportions vary around the fitted lines the "In School" group is shrinking with age and the "Not in 
School" group is growing, however there is no discrete change at age 19 in the mix of these groups. There are 17,058 individuals coded as not in school and 7,202 
coded as in school.
Estimates of Size of Discontinuity in 
Proportion Uninsured.
                           RD      (SE)
Not in School     7.09    (1.38)
In School           -3.41    (1.63)Figure 4: Age Profile of Loss of Insurance Due to Age or Leaving School by School Attendance








































































Notes: See notes from Figure 2. In the National Health Interview Survey the respondent is asked the following question regarding all household members that are 
currently without health insurance. "Which of these are reasons (you/subject name) stopped being covered or do not have health insurance?" One possible answer 
they can choose from is "Ineligible because of age/left school".
Estimates of Size of Discontinuity in 
Loss of Insurance Due to Age/School 
Enrollment.
                           RD         (SE)
Not in School     5.64       (1.07)
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Notes: The Emergency Department datasets used to make the age profiles above are a near census of ED visits in Arizona  (2005-2007), California  (2005-
2007), Iowa (2004-2007), New Jersey (2004-2007) and Wisconsin (2004-2007). Only hospitals that are not under state oversight do not contribute data. The 





Estimates of Size of Discontinuity in Insurance 
Coverage
                                RD          (SE)
Private                 -0.0499    (0.0022)
Uninsured             0.0572    (0.0017)
Medicaid              -0.0082    (0.0018)
Other Insurance   -0.0009    (0.0009)
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Estimates of Size of Discontinuity in ED Visits 
by Gender
                                      RD          (SE)
Female ln(visits)     -0.0360    (0.0053)
Male ln(visits)         -0.0328    (0.0056)
Notes: See notes from Figure 5. The age profiles are in rates per 10,000 person years. The dependant variable for the regression estimates is the 
natural log of the admission counts. The female category does not include pregnant women (13.5% of ED visits). Patients that present at the ED and 
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Estimates of Size of Discontinuity in ED Visits 
by Hospital Ownership
                                         RD         (SE)  
Non Profit ln(visits)       -0.0374   (0.0064)
Public ln(visits)             -0.0057   (0.0102)
For Profit ln(visits)        -0.0438   (0.0101)



















































































Estimates of Size of Discontinuity in 
Insurance Coverage
                               RD           (SE)
Private                -0.0496     (0.0027)
Medicaid              0.0209     (0.0023)
Uninsured            0.0261     (0.0016)





Notes: The hospital discharge datasets used to make the age profiles include a near census of hospital stays in Arizona  (2000-2007), California  (1990-2006), Iowa 
(2004-2007), New York (1990-2006), Texas (1999-2003) and Wisconsin (2004-2007). Women that are pregnant have been dropped from the sample. Combining the 
data from the six states gives a sample of 849,610 18 and 19 year olds. Each of the points plotted above is the proportion of people with a particular type of 



































Female not Pregnant 
Through ED
Female not Pregnant not 
Through ED
Male Not Through ED
Estimates of Size of Discontinuity in Admissions
                                                          RD            (SE)
Male Via ED                                   -0.0195      (0.0075)
Female Not Pregnant Via ED         -0.0125      (0.0122)
Male not Via ED                             -0.0670      (0.0114)
Female not Pregnant not Via ED   -0.0602       (0.0089)
Notes: See notes from Figure 8. Each of the points plotted above is the number of people admitted to the hospital at a particular month in age. The line laying over the 
points is the fitted values from a linear regression estimated from the observations on either side of the age 19 cut off. The point estimate in the box is the estimate 



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employed 52.1 55.0 3.0 3.4 -2.4 -1.7
In School 33.3 17.9 -15.4 -18.6 1.0 0.7
Percent Days Drinking 5.9 5.9 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.4
Smoker 20.5 33.8 13.3 8.7 -0.3 -0.2
Flu Shot Last 12 Months 15.5 10.2 -5.4 -4.7 -2.2 -1.2
Married 3.5 7.7 4.2 9.1 -0.5 -1.0
White 70.2 50.0 -20.2 -22.0 3.8 2.7
Black 13.5 16.1 2.7 3.9 -1.1 -1.0
Hispanic 10.8 28.7 18.0 25.0 -1.5 -1.7
Male 49.2 53.7 4.6 5.3 -1.1 -0.7
Table 1: Differences Between Insured and Uninsured Young Adults
(National Health Interview Survey 1997-2007)
Notes: All the estimates in the table are based on a dataset created by stacking the NHIS Person Files and Sample Adult 
Files for the 1997-2007 survey years. All the estimates are presented in percents. The estimates are weighted and the 
standard errors are adjusted to account for the stratified sampling frame. The outcomes Flu Shot, Smoker and Percent 
Days Drinking are coded from the NHIS Sample Adult files 1997-2007 which include 8,121 respondents surveyed within 
12 months of their 19th birthday. The remaining variables are coded from the NHIS Person file 1997-2007 which includes 
24,260 respondents surveyed within 12 months of their 19th birthday. The regression discontinuity estimates in the 
column 5 and its t-statistic in column 6 are from a linear polynomial interacted with an indicator variable for over 19 
estimated from all respondents surveyed within 12 months of their 19th birthday.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All -2.01 -2.49 4.12 4.61 -1.00 -1.03 -1.15 -1.13
[1.31] [1.23] [1.12] [1.09] [0.75] [0.72] [0.69] [0.7]
-5.33 -5.05 7.09 7.11 -0.06 -0.34 -1.86 -1.89
[1.6] [1.52] [1.38] [1.37] [0.91] [0.88] [0.89] [0.89]
6.21 4.13 -3.41 -2.29 -3.04 -2.33 0.48 0.74
[2.12] [2.05] [1.63] [1.63] [1.30] [1.25] [1.20] [1.20]
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: For each population above the table includes an estimate of the discrete change in the variable that 
occurs at age 19 with its standard error in brackets below. The regressions are estimates via a linear probability 
model and the point estimates have been multiplied by 100 to put them in percentage points. Underneath the 
standard error we include an estimate of the average level of the variable just before people turn 19. The 
regressions all include a dummy for over age 19 and a linear term in age interacted with the dummy. The 
regressions are weighted to take into account the stratified sampling frame in the NHIS. The second regression 
of each pair includes the following covariates Hispanic, black, male, employed, attending school and married. 
7.44
In School




The regressions estimated using the subpopulation of respondents that are not in school do not include the 
indicator variable for attending school. The regression estimated using respondents that are in school do not 
include the indicator variable for attending school or the indicator variable for employed. The regressions 
include all young adults surveyed within 12 months of their 19th birthday of which there are 24,260 in the NHIS 
person files between 1997 and 2007 for whom month of birth is available (11.1% of people in this approximate 
age range do not have a recorded month of birth). Respondents were asked if they had a job or were looking 
for work. Those that responded they weren't could choose among several explanations one of which was "going 
to school". We coded people who responded "Going to School" as in school though it is clear the pattern of 
questions makes it likely that some individuals that are in school will be coded as not in school. Of the 
individuals with birth months available 17,058 are coded as not in school and 7,202 are coded as in school.
Table 2: Change in Distribution of Insurance Coverage at Age 19
Private 
Insurance Uninsured Medicaid Other Insurance
64.76 20.06 8.87 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All 4.30 4.32 -0.67 -0.52
[0.8] [0.79] [0.67] [0.68]
5.64 5.51 -1.01 -0.85
[1.07] [1.06] [0.86] [0.87]
0.53 0.73 0.27 0.18
[0.76] [0.75] [0.88] [0.89]
Covariates No Yes No Yes
1.67 2.23
Notes: See notes from Table 2. In the National Health Interview Survey the respondent is asked 
the following question regarding all household members that are currently without health 
insurance. "Which of these are reasons (you/subject name) stopped being covered or do not 
have health insurance?" One possible answer they can choose from is "Ineligible because of 
age/left school". Respondents that report having health insurance are asked if the insurance is 





Table 3: Cause of Insurance Loss and Source of Coverage
Lost Insurance Due to Age Insurance in Own NamePrivate Uninsured Medicaid Other  Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.0628 0.0810 -0.0166 -0.0015
[0.0026] [0.0046] [0.0024] [0.0010]
0.4471 0.2154 0.2644 0.0731
-0.0628 0.0842 -0.0200 -0.0014
[0.0027] [0.0048] [0.0024] [0.0011]
0.4647 0.2178 0.2417 0.0759
-0.0657 0.0831 -0.0191 0.0017
[0.0035] [0.0050] [0.0026] [0.0015]
0.4632 0.2479 0.1949 0.0941
-0.0605 0.0791 -0.0156 -0.0030
[0.0030] [0.0056] [0.0032] [0.0012]
0.4336 0.1942 0.3159 0.0563
-0.0597 0.0844 -0.0216 -0.0031
[0.0033] [0.0059] [0.0029] [0.0014]
0.4639 0.1953 0.2820 0.0588
Table 4: Change at Age 19 in Insurance Coverage of Emergency Department Visits 
then using the estimated percent drop in admissions to adjust the coverage estimates. The regressions are run on the averages for 
one month cells as this is the most refined version of the age variable available. The regressions include all individuals 18 to 20 
that appear in the Emergency Department records. There are 1,789,954 admissions in this age range, of these 1,025,554 are for 
females, 712,904 are male and the remainder are of unknown gender.
Notes: The Emergency Department visits used to estimate the regressions are a near census of ED visits in Arizona  (2005-2007), 
California  (2005-2007), Iowa (2004-2007), New Jersey (2004-2007) and Wisconsin (2004-2007).The parameter estimates in the 
table above are the percentage point change in insurance coverage when people age out of their insurance coverage on the last 
day of the month in which they turn 19. The standard errors are in brackets directly below the parameter estimates. Below the SE 
we have included the estimated level of the dependant variable immediately before people age out. The parameter estimates are 
adjusted for the decline in admissions under the assumption that the decline in admission is due entirely to people losing their 












(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.0333 -0.0058 -0.0375 -0.0438
[0.0060] [0.0102] [0.0064] [0.0102]
-0.0351 -0.0094 -0.0385 -0.0471
[0.0061] [0.0112] [0.0063] [0.0112]
-0.0329 0.0076 -0.039 -0.0505
[0.0056] [0.0135] [0.0054] [0.0138]
-0.033 -0.017 -0.0353 -0.0404
[0.0080] [0.0143] [0.0084] [0.0132]
-0.036 -0.0264 -0.0366 -0.0457
[0.0080] [0.0166] [0.0085] [0.0154]
Table 5: Change at Age 19 in Volume of Emergency Department Visits
Notes: See notes from Table 4. The dependent variable in all the regressions above is the log of admissions at each age in 
months. Of the 1,789,954 total visits among people age 18 and 19: 263,524 are to public hospitals, 1,310,168 are to non 







FemaleAll Visits Public Hospitals Non Profit Hospitals For Profit Hospitals
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.4041 -0.0709 -0.4539 -0.5292
[0.0776] [0.1259] [0.0832] [0.1296]
 
 
-0.4094 -0.1110 -0.4490 -0.5468
[0.0762] [0.1332] [0.0792] [0.1368]
-0.3889 0.0915 -0.4601 -0.5926
[0.0714] [0.1625] [0.0708] [0.1700]
-0.4099 -0.2127 -0.4380 -0.5009
[0.1053] [0.1814] [0.1108] [0.1707]
-0.4191 -0.3088 -0.4261 -0.5295
[0.0994] [0.1979] [0.1052] [0.1864]
 








Notes: See notes from Table 5. The estimates above are the ratio of the change in admissions to the overall change in insurance 
coverage. The standard errors are in brackets below the estimates. The ratios and their standard errors are computed by estimating 
the relevant regressions via seemingly unrelated regression.Private Uninsured Medicaid Other  Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.0458 0.0271 0.0187 0.0005
[0.0027] [0.0052] [0.0032] [0.0005]
0.3392 0.0762 0.5396 0.0420
-0.0691 0.0626 0.0072 0.0010
[0.0043] [0.0049] [0.0034] [0.0013]
0.4888 0.1313 0.2896 0.0849
-0.0621 0.0496 0.0121 0.0016
[0.0043] [0.0075] [0.0044] [0.0015]
0.5137 0.0993 0.3266 0.0543
-0.0332 0.0091 0.0239 0.0001
[0.0029] [0.0078] [0.0056] [0.0005]
0.2311 0.0476 0.6986 0.0217
Table 7: Change at 19 in Insurance Coverage of People Admitted to the Hospital
Female 
Pregnant
Notes: The estimates above are from a near census of hospital stays in Arizona  (2000-2007), California  (1990-2006), Iowa (2004-
2007), New York (1990-2006), Texas (1999-2003) and Wisconsin (2004-2007). Combining the data from the six states gives a 
sample of 849,610 18 and 19 year olds. This table presents estimates of the change in insurance coverage (among people admitted 
to the hospital) that occurs on the first day of the month after people turn 19. Directly below the estimates are the standard errors of 
the estimates and below the standard errors are the proportion of the population with this type of coverage immediately before 
people age out at 19. The estimates are made using a linear polynomial in age for estimated using admissions among people age 

























Table 8: Change at Age 19 in Admissions to the Hospital
Female not 
Pregnant
Notes: See notes from Table 7. The dependant variable is the log of admissions and the results are for overall 

















     
-0.6052 -0.3087 -1.0352
[0.1030] [0.1222] [0.2004]
   
-0.6599 -0.2503 -1.1791
[0.2010] [0.2510] [0.2569]
   
-0.5853 1.2829 -0.8668
[1.0731] [1.5496] [1.2521]
















Notes: See notes from Table 8. The elasticities above are the impact of losing insurance on hospital 
admissions. They are computed by dividing the percent change in admissions by the percent change in the 
population that is uninsured.
Female 
Pregnant
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Black Dots: Threshold Set on 
day of 19th Birthday
Red Squares: Threshold Set on Last Day 
of Month in Which 19th Birthday Falls


































Uninsured - 1.96 SE
Lost Insurance Due to 
Age or Leaving School
Lost Insurance Due to Age or 
Leaving School + 1.96 SE
Notes: The estimates above are the discrete change at age 19 from a local linear regression with a symmetric bandwidth. The heavy line is the point 
estimate and the lighter lines are the confidence intervals. Appendix 3: Assessing Sensitivity of Estimate of Change in Insurance to Bandwidth Choice




































Uninsured - 1.96 SE
Lost Insurance Due to 
Age or Leaving School
Lost Insurance Due to Age or 
Leaving School + 1.96 SE
Notes: The estimates above are the discrete change at age 19 from a local linear regression with a symmetric bandwidth. The heavy line is the point 







































Uninsured - 1.96 SE
Lost Insurance Due to 
Age or Leaving School Lost Insurance Due to Age or 
Leaving School + 1.96 SE
Notes: The estimates above are the discrete change at age 19 from a local linear regression with a symmetric bandwidth. The heavy line is the point 








































Notes: Regressions and proportions are weighted to take into account the stratified structure of the NHIS. The regression lines superimposed on the proportions are from a linear polyno
in age interacted with a dummy that takes on a value of one for people over 19 and 0 otherwise. This regression is fit on the micro data rather than the means of the bins. The age variable is 
centered on the last day of the month on which the individual's 19th birthday falls. Individuals with unknown month of birth comprise 11.1 percent of the surveyed population that are 18 
at the time of the survey and they have been dropped from the analysis. The age profiles above include 17,058 individuals from the NHIS person files.
Other Insurance
Estimates of Size of Discontinuity in 
Insurance Coverage.
                           RD      (SE)
Private              -5.33    (1.60)
Uninsured          7.09    (1.38)
Medicaid           -0.06    (0.91)








































Notes: Regressions and proportions are weighted to take into account the stratified structure of the NHIS. The regression lines superimposed on the proportions are from a linear 
polynomial in age interacted with a dummy that takes on a value of one for people over 19 and 0 otherwise. This regression is fit on the micro data rather than the means of the 
bins. The age variable is centered on the last day of the month on which the individual's 19th birthday falls. Individuals with unknown month of birth comprise 11.1 percent of the 
surveyed population that are 18 or 19 at the time of the survey and they have been dropped from the analysis. The age profiles above include 7,202 individuals from the NHIS 
person files
Other Insurance
Estimates of Size of Discontinuity in 
Insurance Coverage.
                          RD        (SE)
Private              6.21      (2.12)
Uninsured        -3.41     (1.63)
Medicaid          -3.04      (1.30)



















































Estimates of Size of Discontinuity in Insurance 
Coverage.
                                           RD       (SE)
Not in School             
 -Own Name                     -1.01     (0.86)
In School
 -Own Name                     0.27     (0.88)
In School
Insurance in Own Name 
Not in School 
Insurance in Own Name  
Notes: See notes from Appendix 6.Appendix 8: Age Profile of Delay in Care Due to Cost

















































































Notes: See notes from Figure 2. The question used to construct the age profiles in this figure reads as follows. "During the past 12 months, has medical care 
been delayed for {person} because of worry about the cost? (Do not include dental care)."
Estimates of Size of Discontinuity in 
Delay in Care Due to Cost
                         RD            (SE)
 All                 0.0154        0.0048Appendix 9: Age Profile of Forging Care Due to Cost







































































Notes: See notes from Figure 2. The question used to construct the age profiles in this figure reads as follows. "During the past 12 months, was there any 
time when {person} needed medical care, but did not get it because {person} couldn't afford it?"
Estimates of Size of Discontinuity in 
Forgo Care Due to Cost
                    RD            (SE)
All            0.0149        0.0040Appendix 10: Age Profile of See Provider in Last Two Weeks












































































Notes: See notes from Figure 2. The question used to construct the age profiles in this figure reads as follows. "During those 2 weeks, did {person} see a doctor 
or other health care professional at a doctor's office, a clinic, an emergency room, or some other place? (do no include times during an overnight hospital stay)"
Estimates of Size of Discontinuity in 
Seeing Provider in Last 2 Weeks
                      RD          (SE)
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Notes: The regressions in the paper all have age cells of approximately 30 because age is typically only available in months. The heavy lines are the estimates 
of the RD and the lighter lines are the confidence intervals.
This is the RD estimate when the running 
variable is age in days
This is the RD estimate when the running variable is age in months as it 
is in most of the paper as this is what is available on most datasets
RD at Age 19 in hospital admissions 
through the ED for men
RD at Age 19 in hospital admissions not 
through the ED for menAppendix 12: Assessing Sensitivity to Bandwidth Choice of Estimate of Change in Insurance Among 


































RD in Proportion Without 
Insurance - 1.96 SE
RD in Proportion Without 
Insurance 
RD in Proportion Without 
Insurance + 1.96 SE
Notes: The estimates above are the discrete change at age 19 from a local linear regression with a symmetric bandwidth. The heavy line is the point 
estimate and the lighter lines are the confidence intervals. 
RD in Proportion With 
Private Coverage
RD in Proportion With Private 
Coverage + 1.96 SE
RD in Proportion With Private 
Coverage - 1.96 SEPrivate Uninsured Medicaid Other  Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.0628 0.0810 -0.0166 -0.0015
[0.0026] [0.0046] [0.0024] [0.0010]
0.4471 0.2154 0.2644 0.0731
-0.0437 0.0537 -0.0052 -0.0048
[0.0053] [0.0108] [0.0064] [0.0031]
0.3462 0.2144 0.3519 0.0874
-0.0659 0.0760 -0.0059 -0.0042
[0.0036] [0.0057] [0.0029] [0.0017]
0.4073 0.2141 0.2944 0.0842
    
-0.0514 0.0740 -0.0209 -0.0017
[0.0072] [0.0105] [0.0059] [0.0027]
0.4935 0.1818 0.2654 0.0593
-0.0722 0.0851 -0.0144 0.0015
[0.0038] [0.0044] [0.0029] [0.0011]
0.5637 0.2751 0.1180 0.0431
    
-0.0613 0.1331 -0.0799 0.0081
[0.0068] [0.0100] [0.0060] [0.0027]
0.4937 0.1490 0.2872 0.0701
Appendix 13: Change at Age 19 in Insurance Coverage of Emergency Department 
Visits by State 
Notes: The Emergency Department visits used to estimate the regressions are a near census of ED visits in Arizona  (2005-2007), 
California  (2005-2007), Iowa (2004-2007), New Jersey (2004-2007) and Wisconsin (2004-2007).The parameter estimates in the 
table above are the percentage point change in insurance coverage when people age out of their insurance coverage on the last 
day of the month in which they turn 19. The standard errors are in brackets directly below the parameter estimates. Below the SE 
we have included the estimated level of the dependant variable immediately before people age out. The parameter estimates are 
adjusted for the decline in admissions under the assumption that the decline in admission is due entirely to people losing their 
insurance coverage. The adjustment is made by estimating the insurance coverage regression and the log(admissions) 






New JerseyAppendix 14: Assessing Sensitivity to Bandwidth Choice of Estimate of Change in Number of People 
































RD in ln(female admissions) + 1.96 SE RD in ln(female visits)
Notes: The estimates above are the discrete change at age 19 from a local linear regression with a symmetric bandwidth. The heavy line is the point 
estimate and the lighter lines are the confidence intervals. 
RD in ln(male ED visits)





(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.0333 -0.0058 -0.0375 -0.0438
[0.0060] [0.0102] [0.0064] [0.0102]
-0.0287 0.0006 -0.0283 -0.0427
[0.0132] [0.0325] [0.0155] [0.0212]
-0.0368 -0.0012 -0.0463 -0.0473
[0.0074] [0.0107] [0.0089] [0.0101]
-0.0444 -0.0295 -0.0502 N/A
[0.0136] [0.0267] [0.0148] N/A
-0.0164 -0.0013 -0.0177 0.0729
[0.0080] [0.0354] [0.0087] [0.0645]
-0.0464 0.0210 -0.0493 0.0823
[0.0126] [0.0867] [0.0126] [0.0646]
Appendix 15: Change at Age 19 in Volume of Emergency Department Visits by 
State
Notes: See notes from Appendix 13. The dependent variable in all the regressions above is the log of admissions at each age 
in months. Of the 1,789,954 total visits among people age 18 and 19: 263,524 are to public hospitals, 1,310,168 are to non 
profits, 193,023 are to for profit hospitals and the remaining admissions are to hospitals of unknown ownership type. In the 






New JerseyAll Admissions Public Hospitals Non Profit Hospitals For Profit Hospitals
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.4041 -0.0709 -0.4539 -0.5292
[0.0776] [0.1259] [0.0832] [0.1296]
-0.5267 0.0106 -0.5197  -0.7773
[0.2681] [0.6049] [0.3073] [0.4257]
-0.4755 -0.0163 -0.5954 -0.6074
[0.1038] [0.1407] [0.1256] [0.1408]
 
 
-0.5862 -0.3931 -0.6616 N/A
[0.2024] [0.3650] [0.2218] N/A
 
 
-0.1908 -0.0147 -0.2065 0.8880
[0.0945] [0.4159] [0.1027] [0.7591]
 
 
-0.3407 0.1594 -0.3616 0.6446
[0.0982] [0.6516] [0.0987] [0.4877]
 
Appendix 16: Estimates of Impact of Losing Insurance Coverage on Emergency 
Department Visits by State
Notes: See notes from Appendix 14. The estimates above are the ratio of the change in admissions to the overall change in insurance 
coverage. The standard errors are in brackets below the estimates. The ratios and their standard errors are computed by estimating 






New JerseyAppendix 17: Assessing Sensitivity to Bandwidth Choice of Estimate of Change in Insurance Among 





































e RD in Proportion Without 
Insurance 
RD in Proportion Without 
Insurance + 1.96 SE
Notes: The estimates above are the discrete change at age 19 from a local linear regression with a symmetric bandwidth. The heavy line is the point 
estimate and the lighter lines are the confidence intervals. 
RD in Proportion With 
Private Coverage
RD in Proportion With Private 
Coverage - 1.96 SEPrivate Uninsured Medicaid Other  Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.0458 0.0271 0.0187 0.0005
[0.0027] [0.0052] [0.0032] [0.0005]
0.3392 0.0762 0.5396 0.0420
-0.0409 0.0294 0.0091 0.0031
[0.0070] [0.0102] [0.0081] [0.0028]
0.3090 0.0436 0.5704 0.0724
-0.0439 0.0272 0.0168 0.0004
[0.0029] [0.0057] [0.0034] [0.0007]
0.3309 0.0660 0.5638 0.0368
-0.0402 -0.0192 0.0651 -0.0059
[0.0231] [0.0254] [0.0208] [0.0048]
0.4103 0.0537 0.5037 0.0325
-0.0599 0.0256 0.0353 -0.0003
[0.0038] [0.0059] [0.0045] [0.0012]
0.3837 0.0985 0.4846 0.0296
-0.0234 0.0252 -0.0014 -0.0003
[0.0042] [0.0089] [0.0071] [0.0021]
0.2787 0.0960 0.5436 0.0787
-0.0856 0.0830 -0.0142 0.0184
[0.0087] [0.0167] [0.0147] [0.0061]
0.4774 0.0497 0.4342 0.0370
Appendix 18: Change at 19 in Insurance Coverage of People Admitted to the Hospital 
by State
Wisconsin
Notes: The estimates above are from a near census of hospital stays in Arizona  (2000-2007), California  (1990-2006), Iowa (2004-
2007), New York (1990-2006), Texas (1999-2003) and Wisconsin (2004-2007). Combining the data from the six states gives a 
sample of 849,610 18 and 19 year olds. This table presents estimates of the change in insurance coverage (among people admitted 
to the hospital) that occurs on the first day of the month after people turn 19. Directly below the estimates are the standard errors of 
the estimates and below the standard errors are the proportion of the population with this type of coverage immediately before 
people age out at 19. The estimates are made using a linear polynomial in age for estimated using admissions among people age 







TexasAppendix 19: Assessing Sensitivity to Bandwidth Choice of the Estimate of the Change in Number of 






































RD in ln(Admissions of Men not Through ED)
Notes: The estimates above are the discrete change at age 19 from a local linear regression with a symmetric bandwidth. The heavy line is the point estimate 
and the lighter lines are the confidence intervals. 
RD in ln(Admissions of Men Through ED)Appendix 20: Assessing Sensitivity to Bandwidth Choice of the Estimate of the Change in Number of 






































RD in ln(Admissions of Women not Through ED)
Notes: The estimates above are the discrete change at age 19 from a local linear regression with a symmetric bandwidth. The heavy line is the point 
estimate and the lighter lines are the confidence intervals. Pregnant women are not included in the analysis.
RD in ln(Admissions of Women Through ED)All Visits
Via Emergency 
Department

















Appendix 21: Change at Age 19 in Admissions to the Hospital 
California
Notes: See notes from Table 8. The dependant variable is the log of admissions and the results are for overall 





























Notes: See notes from Table 9. The elasticities above are the impact of insurance on hospital admissions. 









(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.0154 0.0170 -0.0142 -0.8267
[0.0018] [0.0028] [0.0036] [0.2517]
0.3555 0.3111  
-0.0170 0.0193 -0.0165 -0.8477
[0.0020] [0.0028] [0.0037] [0.2281]
0.3651 0.3218   
 
-0.0195 0.0230 -0.0212 -0.9107
[0.0031] [0.0041] [0.0056] [0.2930]
0.3406 0.3995   
 
-0.0117 0.0117 -0.0083 -0.7013
[0.0018] [0.0034] [0.0055] [0.5119]
0.3640 0.2503   
 
-0.0140 0.0150 -0.0115 -0.7627
[0.0020] [0.0031] [0.0053] [0.3864]




Notes: The Emergency Department visits used to estimate the regressions are a near census of ED visits in Arizona  (2005-2007), 
California  (2005-2007), Iowa (2004-2007), New Jersey (2004-2007) and Wisconsin (2004-2007).The parameter estimates in the 
table above are the percentage point change in insurance coverage when people age out of their insurance coverage on the last 
day of the month in which they turn 23. The standard errors are in brackets directly below the parameter estimates. Below the SE 
we have included the estimated level of the dependant variable immediately before people age out. The parameter estimates are 
adjusted for the decline in admissions under the assumption that the decline in admission is due entirely to people losing their 
insurance coverage. The adjustment is made by estimating the insurance coverage regression and the ln(admissions) regressions 
via seemingly unrelated regression.
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Estimates of Size of Discontinuity in ED Visits 
and Proportion Uninsured at Age 20
                                         RD         (SE)  
ln(ED visits)                 -0.004      (0.004)
Uninsured                     0.003      (0.002)
Counts of ED Visits
Uninsured